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Abstract
The principle of complementarity undergirds the International Criminal Court’s
(ICC) admissibility regime. And yet, in the negotiations leading up to the 2010
Review Conference, delegates did not fully focus on the potential for the addition of
the crime of aggression to destabilize the Court’s complementarity regime. The only
guidance from the Assembly of States Parties came in the form of two interpretive
Understandings that express a subtle preference that the states parties do not incorp-
orate the crime into their domestic codes. If states parties heed this call, which they
should, the Court will face situations in which there is incomplete concurrence be-
tween the prosecuting state’s domestic law and the ICC Statute given that few
states have codified the crime of aggression. Under prevailing interpretations of the
principle of complementarity, however, a case would be admissible before the Court
if a domestic court were prosecuting atrocity crimes, but not the crime of aggression.
This article argues that the Prosecutor should therefore announce in advance of the
amendments’ activation the intention to stay his or her hand in the event that genu-
ine domestic prosecutions are going forward on the basis of charges of genocide,
crimes against humanity, or war crimes, even if potential domestic aggression
charges are not available, are legally barred, or are not forthcoming. The only excep-
tion to this general approach should be in cases in which the crime of aggression is
the primary or central charge to arise out of a particular situation, such that atro-
city crimes are non-existent or largely peripheral. The article thus advocates that
the ICC be allowed to exercise a de facto primacy over the crime of aggression
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vis-a' -vis domestic courts, which will retain the ability to take the lead on prosecuting
the atrocity crimes. Such a division of labour between the ICC and domestic courts
will ensure that to the extent that the crime of aggression is ever prosecuted, it is
done in an international, rather than domestic, forum pursuant to a consensus
penal definition and a negotiated jurisdictional regime.
1. Introduction
As a foundational premise, the International Criminal Court (ICC or the Court)
is meant to supplement, not supplant, national prosecutions of international
crimes. This overarching objective is reflected in the principle of complemen-
tarity, which states that a case is inadmissible before the ICC if it is being prose-
cuted domestically in any national court with jurisdiction unless the
domestic proceedings have been launched for the purpose of shielding the
accused from accountability or are otherwise a sham.1 The Pre-Trial Chamber
of the ICC has so far interpreted the principle of complementarity according
to a same person/same conduct test: the Court will stay its hand if a domestic
court is prosecuting the same suspect for the same impugned conduct, regard-
less of how the crime is legally characterized. Thus, the Chamber considers
itself to be empowered to proceed with a case unless there is a fair degree of
concurrence between the pending domestic charges and potential ICC charges.
The principle of complementarity assumes that states have both prescriptive
and adjudicative jurisdiction over conduct that rises to the level of an interna-
tional crime. The former concept requires states to have incorporated the rele-
vant international crimes into their domestic codes or to have penalized
analogous and lesser included offences, such as murder, rape and torture. The
latter assumes an available basis of jurisdiction, such as territorial, nationality
or even ç as is permissible with respect to many international crimes ç uni-
versal jurisdiction. The newly codified crime of aggression2 calls both of these
assumptions into question.
At the moment, very few states can prosecute this crime domestically under
any jurisdictional basis.3 And, most atrocity crimes and ordinary domestic
crimes do not proscribe the same conduct as the crime of aggression. As a
result, in a situation involving allegations that an individual committed both
the crime of aggression and a war crime, most domestic courts would be able
to prosecute the latter crime but not the former one. The same person/same
1 Art. 17 ICCSt.
2 Resolution RC/Res. 6, adopted at the 13th plenary meeting of the first Review Conference of the
Rome Statute, 11 June 2010, by consensus, available online at http://www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/
ASP/Sessions/OfficialþRecords/ReviewþConference.htm (visited 12 January 2012) (hereinafter,
‘Res. 6’).
3 See generally, A. Reisinger Coracini, ‘Evaluating Domestic Legislation on the Customary Crime
of Aggression Under the Rome Statute’s Complementarity Regime’, in C. Stahn and G. Sluiter
(eds), The Emerging Practice of the International Criminal Court (Brill, 2009) 735 (cataloguing
the few national codes containing the crime of aggression).
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conduct test would then countenance the ICC’s assertion of jurisdiction, if and
when the Assembly of State Parties (ASP) decides to activate the aggression
amendments. Preempting domestic court jurisdiction under these circum-
stances might ultimately undermine the very purpose behind the principle of
complementarity ç the promotion of genuine domestic prosecutions of inter-
national crimes.4
In the negotiations preceding the 2010 Review Conference in Kampala,
Uganda, delegates engaged in the multilateral negotiations surrounding the
crime of aggression and its jurisdictional regime did not focus on the potential
for the addition of the crime of aggression in the ICC Statute to destabilize the
Court’s complementarity regime.5 Indeed, it was ultimately decided to leave
the default complementarity regime intact vis-a' -vis the crime of aggression.
In two interpretive Understandings (4 and 5) contained in the resolution adopt-
ing the final amendments to the Statute, however, delegates both expressed a
subtle preference that states parties not incorporate the crime of aggression
into their domestic codes and insisted that the amendments create no legal ob-
ligation or authorization to do so.6 This suggestion creates a dilemma: if states
parties heed this caution, the Court will inevitably be faced with situations in
which there is incomplete concurrence between the prosecuting state’s domes-
tic law and the ICC Statute such that complementarity would dictate that the
Court assert jurisdiction. States parties may thus be tempted to codify the
crime of aggression in order to preserve their ability to exercise domestic juris-
diction over situations involving ICC crimes, thus undermining the intent of
the Understandings.
This article on complementarity and aggression addresses this dilemma on
the basis of two premises. The first is that the ASP and the rest of the interna-
tional community should, as a general rule, discourage domestic prosecutions
4 To be sure, the ICC would not necessarily fully divest domestic courts of jurisdiction if it were to
proceed with a prosecution under these circumstances. Rather, a negotiation would ensue be-
tween the ICC and the state to determine the sequencing of prosecution. See Arts 89(4) and
94 ICCSt. However, it is doubtful that a state would expend judicial resources on a parallel pros-
ecution once the ICC steps in.
5 See N. Strapatsas,‘Complementarity & Aggression: ATicking Time Bomb’, in C. Stahn and L. van
den Herik (eds), Future Perspectives on International Criminal Justice (TMC Asser Press, 2010)
450, at 456.
6 Res. 6, Annex III, Understandings 4 and 5, read as follows:
Domestic jurisdiction over the crime of aggression
4. It is understood that the amendments that address the definition of the act of aggres-
sion and the crime of aggression do so for the purpose of this Statute only. The amend-
ments shall, in accordance with article 10 of the Rome Statute, not be interpreted as
limiting or prejudicing in any way existing or developing rules of international law for
purposes other than this Statute.
5. It is understood that the amendments shall not be interpreted as creating the right or
obligation to exercise domestic jurisdiction with respect to an act of aggression com-
mitted by another State.
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for the crime of aggression because such cases will not proceed according to
the consensus regime adopted by the ASP and have the potential to exacerbate
international tensions. The one circumstance in which such prosecutions
might be appropriate is when a state prosecutes its own citizen(s) for launching
an act of aggression pursuant to the active nationality principle of jurisdiction.
For both legal and policy reasons, states other than the nationality state ç
including victim states, other implicated states, and third party states exercis-
ing extraordinary bases of jurisdiction ç should in general refrain from such
prosecutions so that cases involving the crime of aggression proceed almost
exclusively before the ICC. A second supposition of this article is that the ASP
and the rest of the international community should continue to encourage do-
mestic prosecutions for the so-called atrocity crimes ç war crimes, crimes
against humanity, and genocide ç in keeping with the foundational principle
of complementarity and states’ treaty-based and customary international law
obligations to prosecute these international crimes.
These two premises are in obvious tension with each other. This article sug-
gests one way they can be reconciled in the absence of further guidance from
the ASP. It presents a model for the way in which the ICC Prosecutor should
evaluate crime bases in which atrocity crimes are committed following, or in
connection with, an act of aggression. It argues that when genuine domestic
prosecutions are going forward on the basis of charges of genocide, crimes
against humanity, or war crimes, the Prosecutor should not endeavour to pros-
ecute the same suspects just because domestic aggression charges are not
available under the law, are legally barred, or are not forthcoming.7 In other
words, if a case would otherwise be inadmissible pursuant to Article 17, it
should not be pursued in the ICC on the sole ground that the state that has jur-
isdiction over it is not prosecuting the person concerned for conduct that may
constitute the crime of aggression.
This article accepts one exception to this general approach to harmonizing
the principle of complementarity with the preference for assertions of interna-
tional jurisdiction over the crime of aggression. This exception involves the
scenario in which the crime of aggression is the primary or central charge to
arise out of a particular situation such that atrocity crimes are non-existent
or largely peripheral. Under these circumstances, the Prosecutor should con-
sider opening an investigation into the situation even if other secondary
charges are pending domestically.
If the approach outlined here is implemented, the Court will appropriately
assume a posture of de facto exclusivity over the crime of aggression vis-a' -vis
domestic courts, which will retain the ability to take the lead on prosecuting
atrocity crimes. Such a division of labour between the ICC and domestic
courts will continue to encourage domestic prosecutions in keeping with the
ideal of positive complementarity, reinforce the recognized duty of states to
prosecute international crimes, and avoid overburdening the ICC with cases
7 See Strapatsas, supra note 5, at 464^473 (noting that domestic prosecutions for aggression may
be barred by act of state or political question doctrines).
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that could otherwise proceed effectively in a domestic forum. It will also
ensure that to the extent that the crime of aggression is ever prosecuted
beyond the nationality state, it is done in an international, rather than domes-
tic, forum. Instituting a de facto exclusivity before the ICC over the crime of ag-
gression will enable the Court to develop an institutional competency
vis-a' -vis this controversial crime under a consensus penal definition and sub-
ject to appropriate political and judicial controls. It will also channel such pros-
ecutions into an international institution, thus shielding state courts from
making the highly political determination that another state committed an
act of aggression. That said, granting domestic courts the leeway to pursue
atrocity crimes where aggression charges may also be warranted will inevit-
ably slow the Court’s ability to develop the anti-aggression norm.
The division of labour proposed here can be implemented through a policy of
prosecutorial discretion in the absence of further amendments to the Statute,
developments in case law, or additional guidance or Understandings from the
ASP.8 Prior to the activation of the aggression amendments, the Office of the
Prosecutor (OTP) should develop and announce a general policy of allowing
cases to go forward in domestic courts when genuine prosecutions for the
atrocity crimes are pending there, even when aggression charges may also be
appropriate. Disseminating this policy well in advance of the activation of the
aggression amendments will energize the ASP’s Understandings and discour-
age states from codifying the crime of aggression in an effort to protect
their right to exercise domestic jurisdiction and enjoy the privilege of
complementarity.
2. Jurisdiction over the Crime of Aggression in
Domestic Courts
Up to this point in time, the crime of aggression has been noticeably absent in
the penal codes of the nations of the world. Most domestic courts lack jurisdic-
tion ç under any jurisdictional basis ç over the crime of aggression stricto
sensu, and there is little purely domestic jurisprudence involving the crime.
The only exception is found in some post-World War II cases whose jurisdic-
tional basis is contested and which offer an uncertain precedent for the
notion that domestic courts can, and indeed should, prosecute the crime of
aggression. Of the few states that today allow for the crime to be prosecuted do-
mestically, only some also enable such prosecutions pursuant to extraordinary
8 Art. 17 ICCSt. could be amended, for example, to read something to the effect that: ‘If a case is
otherwise inadmissible pursuant to paragraph 1, it shall not be deemed admissible where the
state which had jurisdiction over it has not tried the person concerned for conduct that may
constitute the crime referred to in article 8 bis.’ Or, the concept of ‘inability’ could be further
defined to mean that ‘the fact that a state has not codified the crime of aggression in its domes-
tic code shall not constitute inability for the purposes of this provision’. These options were
not fully explored in the lead up to the Review Conference.
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bases of jurisdiction, such as universal jurisdiction. Absent an express aggres-
sion provision, there are few domestic analogies to the crime that might be
deemed to cover the same conduct as would be covered by an aggression
charge before the ICC. All this suggests little in the way of state practice or
opinio juris in favour of the exercise of domestic jurisdiction over the crime of
aggression.
A. Post-WorldWar II Case Law
The post-WorldWar II period was a fertile time for aggression prosecutions.9 In
parallel with the work of the international military tribunals at Nuremberg
and in Tokyo ç which were designed to prosecute the major war criminals
‘whose offences [had] no geographical limitation’10 ç the victorious Allies
promulgated Control Council Law No. 10 (CCL 10) to govern the prosecution of
lesser war criminals.11 CCL 10 defined crimes against the peace (the crime of
aggression in the lexicon of the era) almost identically to the corresponding
provision in the Nuremberg Charter except that the definition included the ini-
tiation of an ‘invasion’ along with a ‘war of aggression’ and the list of acts was
non-exhaustive.12
Between them, the United States and France hosted five such trials.13 Even
though France was not explicitly deemed subject to a German war of aggres-
sion, at least according to the Nuremberg Tribunal,14 German actions in inter
alia Poland, Norway and the ex-Soviet Union were deemed to rise to the level
9 For a discussion of post-World War II prosecutions for the crime of aggression, see generally
United Nations (UN), Historical Review of Developments Relating to Aggression (2003) (summar-
izing cases before the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals as well as subsequent trials in the
Allies’ zones of occupation); M. Lippmann, ‘The History, Development, and Decline of Crimes
against Peace’, 36 GeorgeWashington International Law Review (2004) 957; and T. Weigend, ‘In
general a principle of justice’: The Debate on the ‘‘Crime against Peace’’ in the Wake of the
Nuremberg Judgment’ in this issue of the Journal.
10 Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European
Axis, Charter of the International Military Tribunal, 8 August 1945, available online at http://
avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/imtchart.asp (visited 20 December 2011) (hereinafter, ‘IMT Charter’).
11 Control Council, Law No. 10, Punishment of Persons Guilty of War Crimes, Crimes Against the
Peace and Against Humanity, available online at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/imt10.asp
(visited 20 December 2011) (hereinafter: ‘CCL 10’).
12 Ibid., at Art. II(1)(a).
13 See e.g. U.S. v. Krauch et al., VIII Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuremberg Military
Tribunals (hereinafter, ‘TWC’) (1952) 1, 1125^1126 (acquitting principals of the corporation of
the commission of crimes against the peace on the grounds that assisting in the process of
German rearmament per se did not constitute aggression and the defendants were not part
of Hitler’s inner circle).
14 In the Ministries case, however, the military tribunal did consider France to be a victim of
German aggression. K.J. Heller,The Nuremberg Military Tribunals and the Origins of International
Criminal Law (Oxford University Press, 2011), at 180. See U.S. v. vonWeizsaecker et al., XII TWC
(1949) 13, at 419.
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of a war of aggression.15 Whether trials held under CCL 10 are to be considered
domestic or international proceedings remains somewhat contested.16 An ar-
gument can be made that these trials were essentially extensions of the work
of the Nuremberg Tribunal. The quadripartite CCL 10 was drafted to give
effect to the Moscow Declaration of 194317 (in which the United States, the
United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union pledged at armistice to prosecute
German officers, soldiers, and Nazi party members in the courts of the coun-
tries in which their atrocities were committed or in an international tribunal)
and the London Agreement of 194518 (establishing the Nuremberg Tribunal).
That said, although CCL 10 was jointly enacted, trials convened under its au-
thority proceeded in the Allies’ respective zones of occupation and were run
solely by a single responsible state.
If these trials are considered domestic proceedings, the operative jurisdic-
tional basis remains equally uncertain. The allied states that prosecuted indi-
viduals in military tribunals pursuant to CCL 10 were occupying powers,
essentially holding German sovereignty in trust.19 This arrangement suggests
a form of derivative nationality, passive personality, territoriality or protective
jurisdiction. CCL 10 also contemplated the transfer of individuals to other
countries in which crimes were committed for prosecution pursuant to the ter-
ritorial principle of jurisdiction.20 In the event of competing requests for a par-
ticular suspect, the state of nationality was to receive preference.21 Still, these
trials are at times cited as examples of universal jurisdiction.22 Indeed, the
Nuremberg Tribunal itself implied that the crimes in the Charter give rise to
universal jurisdiction23 when it noted that the signatories of the Charter:
15 Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, 1
October 1946, reprinted in 41 American Journal of International Law (AJIL) (1947) 172, at
192^197 (discussing acts of aggression against Austria and Czechoslovakia), 197^203 (discuss-
ing war of aggression in Poland), 203^207 (Denmark and Norway), 207^209 (Belgium, The
Netherlands and Luxembourg), 209^211 (Yugoslavia and Greece), and 211^213 (USSR) (herein-
after, ‘Nuremberg Judgment’). Even the finding that Germany committed aggression against
the United States was of a different order. Ibid., at 213^214 (finding Germany’s declaration of
war and support of Japan to constitute an act of aggression against the United States).
16 See E. Schwelb, ‘Crimes Against Humanity’, 23 BritishYear Book of International Law (1946) 178,
at 218 (considering the tribunals convened pursuant to CCL 10 to be local courts administering
municipal law enacted by the occupation authorities).
17 Joint Four-Nation Declaration (October 1943), available online at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/
wwii/moscow.asp (visited 20 December 2011).
18 London Agreement of 8 August 1945, available online at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/
imtchart.asp (visited 20 December 2011).
19 See Declaration Regarding the Defeat of Germany and the Assumption of Supreme Authority by
Allied Powers (1945), available online at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/wwii/ger01.asp (visited 20
December 2011).
20 Art. IV(2) CCL 10.
21 Art. IV(3) CCL 10.
22 See e.g. M.P. Scharf, ‘Universal Jurisdiction and the Crime of Aggression’, 53 Harvard Journal of
International Law (forthcoming 2012) (on file with the author).
23 See UN Secretary-General, The Charter and Judgment of the Nu« rnberg Tribunal: History and
Analysis, UN Doc. A/CN.4/5 (1949), at 79^80, available online at http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/
documentation/english/a_cn4_5.pdf (visited 20 December 2011) (‘it is also possible ::: that the
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‘have done together what any one of them might have done singly; for it is not
to be doubted that any nation has the right thus to set up special courts to ad-
minister law’.24
Another handful of post-World War II cases proceeded in purely domestic
courts exercising either territorial or protective bases of jurisdiction.25 The
Chinese War Crimes Military Tribunal of the Ministry of National Defence in
Nanking tried Takashi Sakai for crimes against the peace for participating in
the Japanese war of aggression against China.26 Poland prosecuted at least
two individuals for crimes against the peace.27 One had been a citizen of the
Free City of Danzig who helped implement the German reabsorption of the
city and was tried for aggression before the Supreme National Tribunal of
Poland.28 Another prosecution proceeded against a Polish national before a
provincial court inWarsaw.29
Court considered the crimes under the Charter to be, as international crimes, subject to the jur-
isdiction of every State. The case of piracy would then be the appropriate parallel. This inter-
pretation seems to be supported by the fact that the Court affirmed that the signatory Powers
in creating the Tribunal had made use of a right belonging to any nation.’).
24 Nuremberg Judgment, supra note 15, at 216.
25 In the immediate post-WorldWar II period, Australia drafted a domestic statute (theWar Crimes
Act of 1945, No. 48/1945) that enumerated crimes against the peace as a war crime, although
it staged no prosecutions. Australia was not designated as a victim state by the Nuremberg or
TokyoTribunal, so it could be argued that the statute contemplated a form of universal jurisdic-
tion. However, the prosecution of crimes committed against non-residents was allowed only if
the victim was a subject of Great Britain or an allied nation, or with the consent of the
Governor-General. See Australian Law Concerning Trials of War Criminals by Military Courts,
reprinted in V Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals, (Ann.) (1948) (hereinafter, ‘LRTWC’), at
94^98. Some of the US regulations issued allowed for the prosecution of crimes against the
peace (e.g. in the Pacific Theatre). See United States Law and Practice Concerning Trials of
War Criminals By Military Commissions, Military Government Courts and Military Tribunals,
III LRTWC, 103^113. By comparison, the British Royal Warrant allowed only for assertions of
jurisdiction over war crimes, stricto sensu. Art. 1, The War Office, Royal Warrant, Regulations
for the Trial of War Criminals, 0160/2498, A.O. 81/1945, available online at http://avalon.law.
yale.edu/imt/imtroyal.asp (visited 20 December 2011).
26 See Trial of Takashi Sakai, XIV LRTWC (1949) 1, at 5^7. The Chinese ‘Law Governing the Trial of
War Criminals’ (enacted 24 October 1946) is discussed here: XIV LRTWC (1949) 152^160.
27 The ‘Polish Law Concerning the Trials of War Criminals’ is discussed here: VII LRTWC (Ann.)
(1946) 82^91. This legislation includes no crimes against the peace provision per se, but individ-
uals could be prosecuted for domestic crimes against ‘the security and integrity of the state’.
Ibid., at 90. There was, however, a provision criminalizing the instigation of war. Ibid.
28 See Trial of Gauleiter Artu Greiser, XIII LRTWC (1949) 70, at 74^78, 104^105. The Free City of
Danzig (now Gdansk) enjoyed the status of a semi-autonomous city-state by virtue of the
Treaty of Versailles. It was eventually reincorporated into Germany following Germany’s 1939
invasion of Poland.
29 In re Koch, File No. IV K.311/58 (Voivodship Court for the Voivodship of Warsaw), 9 March 1959,
(unpubl.), aff’d, File No. I K.508/59 (Supreme Court) (in Polish), reprinted in 30 International
Law Review (1966) 496. Koch ç administrative head of certain German occupied territory in
Poland ç was charged with crimes against humanity, war crimes, and crimes against the
peace for his role in facilitating the occupation (at 505). He was tried in Poland on application
of the extradition clause in the Moscow Declaration, which provided that individuals were to
be prosecuted in the countries in which they committed their crimes (at 511).
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Before drawing any firm conclusions from these cases, it is important to note
they were all initiated in the afterglow of the Nuremberg/Tokyo proceedings
ç which were themselves sui generis ç and all preceded the development of
modern doctrines of foreign sovereign immunity and universal jurisdiction. In
any case, the jurisdictional basis of these cases is ambiguous enough that it is
hard to draw any firm conclusions from them as to the propriety of domestic
aggression prosecutions today, particularly pursuant to extraordinary bases of
jurisdiction. And, as the analysis below will reveal, states generally did not
codify these results in the immediate aftermath of World War II or during the
universal jurisdiction renaissance in the 1990s, suggesting that these cases
are somewhat of a jurisprudential dead end.
B. The Crime of Aggression in Domestic Penal Codes
The post-World War II proceedings inspired a number of states to incorporate
international crimes into their domestic penal codes. Crimes against the
peace, however, are not well represented in this endeavour. One study of 90 do-
mestic penal codes30 reveals approximately two dozen penal codes containing
some definition of a crime of aggression loosely premised on the definition of
crimes against the peace contained within the Nuremberg and Tokyo
Charters.31 Most of these crimes appear in the penal codes of the states of cen-
tral Asia and eastern Europe32 and most definitions hinge on the waging or
planning of a‘war of aggression’33 in keeping with theWorldWar II approach.34
Many such codes lack a rigorous penal definition setting forth the standard
material and mental elements. A few states also penalize other forms of re-
sponsibility, such as incitement to commit aggression.35 Some penal code
30 Reisinger Coracini, supra note 3, at 734.
31 See Art. 5(a) Special Proclamation of General MacArthur, the Supreme Commander for the
Allied Powers, 14 January 1946.
32 Reisinger Coracini, supra note 3, at 734. Additionally, Art. 14 of the Statute of the Iraqi Higher
Criminal Court incorporates an Iraqi domestic crime that resembles a crime of aggression:
‘The abuse of position and the pursuit of policies that were about to lead to the threat of war
or the use of the armed forces of Iraq against an Arab country, in accordance with Article 1
of Law Number 7 of 1958.’ Law of the Iraqi Higher Criminal Court, Al-Waqaeh al-Iraqia (Iraqi
Official Gazette) 4006 of 18 October 2005, at 13. Saddam Hussein was executed before any
such charges vis-a' -vis the First Gulf War in Kuwait could be levelled against him.
33 For example, the Armenian penal code in Chapter 33 codifies a number of crimes against peace
and human security including the waging of ‘aggressive war’ (a concept left undefined) in
Art. 384, and issuing public calls for ‘aggressive war’ in Art. 385. Armenian Criminal Code,
Arts 384^389, available online at http://www.legislationline.org/documents/section/criminal-
codes/country/45 (visited 20 December 2011).
34 This position is also reflected in Art. 5(2), GA Res. 3314 (XXIX), 14 December 1974, which states
that: ‘[a] war of aggression is a crime against international peace’. By constrast, CCL 10 crimina-
lized the launch of an ‘invasion’ in addition to a war of aggression, which provided a basis to
convict two defendants for their participation in the invasion of Czechoslovakia. See U.S. v.
vonWeizsaecker et al., XIV TWC (1949) 13, at 867, 869.
35 See e.g. Polish Criminal Code Art. 117(3), available online at http://www.legislationline.org/
documents/section/criminal-codes/country/10 (in Polish) (visited 20 December 2011).
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sections render the crime of aggression prosecutable only to the extent that it
was committed in violation of an international treaty;36 others are drafted to
protect sovereign values rather than individual rights.37 For example, in the
German penal code section entitled ‘Crimes Against the Peace of Nations’,
Section 80 (‘Preparation of aWar of Aggression’) states:
Whoever prepares a war of aggression ::: in which the Federal Republic of Germany is sup-
posed to participate and thereby creates a danger of war for the Federal Republic of
Germany, shall be punished with imprisonment for life or for not less than ten years.38
So defined, the crime of aggression may only be prosecuted when the German
state is involved.39
To the extent that domestic codes do contain a provision on the crime of ag-
gression, in most cases prosecutions are limited to territoriality40 or national-
ity41 principles of jurisdiction. A few states allow for the exercise of universal
jurisdiction over all crimes that are prohibited by customary international law
(and it is often argued that crimes against the peace are so prohibited),42
36 For example, Art. 91 of the Estonian Penal Code states: ‘A person leading or participating in
preparations for a war of aggression directed by one state against another state or war violating
international agreements or security guarantees provided by the state, or a representative of
the state who threatens to start a war of aggression, shall be punished by 3 to 12 years’ impris-
onment.’ Art. 92 prohibits propaganda for war followed by provisions addressing war
crimes, piracy, and terrorism. Estonian Criminal Code, Arts 91^92, available online at http://
www.legislationline.org/documents/section/criminal-codes/country/33 (visited 20 December
2011).
37 The French code prohibits at Art. 412^1 attacks consisting of the ‘commission of one or more
acts of violence liable to endanger the institutions of the Republic or violate the integrity of
the national territory’. Code Pe¤ nal, available online at http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/html/
codes_traduits/code_penal_soman.htm (visited 20 December 2011).
38 Strafgesetzbuch (StGB), BundesgesetzblattI, 13 November 1998, at 3322, x80, available online at
http://www.iuscomp.org/gla/statutes/StGB.htm (visited 20 December 2011). Section 80a
(‘Incitement to aWar of Aggression’) continues: ‘Whosoever publicly incites to a war of aggres-
sion (section 80) in a meeting or through the dissemination of written materials :::within the
Federal Republic of Germany shall be liable to imprisonment from three months to five years.’
Ibid., at x 80a.
39 See C. Kre, ‘The German Chief Federal Prosecutor’s Decision Not to Investigate the Alleged
Crime of Preparing Aggression against Iraq’, 2 JICJ (2004) 245, at 246.
40 See e.g. Art. 14 of the Armenian code, allowing for the prosecution of all crimes when com-
mitted on the territory of the Republic. Armenian Criminal Code, supra note 33.
41 See e.g. Krivicni Zakon Bosne i Hercegovine (KZBiH) (Criminal Code of Bosnia and
Herzegovina), Art. 123, Sluz› beni glasnik Bosne i Hercegovine (Official Gazette of Bosnia and
Herzegovina), No. 37/03, 2003, available online at http://www.iccnow.org/documents/criminal-
code-of-bih.pdf (visited 20 December 2011).
42 See R. v. Jones et al. [2006] UKHL 16 (considering the crime of aggression to be part of custom-
ary international law). See also Reisinger Coracini, supra note 3, at 725 (‘The crime of aggres-
sion is a crime under customary international law.’); D. Donat Cattin, ‘Brief Commentary to
the 2010 Amendments to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC)
Concerning the Crime of Aggression’ (arguing that the prohibition against aggression consti-
tutes jus cogens) (on file with author), at 3.
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or that threaten the peace and security of humankind.43 Only a handful of
states are specifically empowered to assert universal jurisdiction over the
crime of aggression per se.44
Notwithstanding this dearth of state practice and opinio juris,45 some com-
mentators assume somewhat unreflectively that the crime of aggression is sub-
ject to universal jurisdiction before domestic courts.46 They often ground
their claim on the World War II precedents,47 reflecting a common conflation
of the principles of international jurisdiction and universal jurisdiction48 and
overlooking the fact that the post-war tribunals more likely exercised an
alternative form of jurisdiction, such as passive personality or protective
jurisdiction.49 The Princeton Principles on Universal Jurisdiction also list
crimes against the peace as one of the crimes over which states may assert
43 For example, Art. 11(3) of the Moldovan Criminal Code allows for universal jurisdiction over
‘crimes [that] are adverse to the interests of the Republic of Moldova or to the peace and secur-
ity of humanity, or constitute war crimes including crimes set forth in the international treaties
to which the Republic of Moldova is a party’. Moldovian Criminal Code, Art. 11(3), available
online at http://www.legislationline.org/documents/section/criminal-codes/country/14 (visited
20 December 2011). See also Bulgarian Criminal Code, Art. 6, available online at http://www
.legislationline.org/documents/section/criminal-codes/country/39 (visited 20 December 2011).
44 For example, Art. 5 of the penal code of Portugal expressly allows for the assertion of universal
jurisdiction over incitement to aggression. Related crimes include recruiting members of the
Portuguese armed forces in a war against a foreign state and the use of mercenaries. See
Portuguese Penal Code, Art. 236, available online at http://www.portolegal.com/CPENAL.htm
(visited 20 December 2011).
45 R.S. Clark, ‘Complementarity and the Crime of Aggression’, in C. Stahn and M.M. El Zeidy (eds),
The International Criminal Court and Complementarity: From Theory to Practice, Vol. II
(Cambridge University Press, 2011) 721, at 731 (‘It is very doubtful that under current custom-
ary law it can be asserted unequivocally that aggression ‘‘is’’ subject to universal jurisdiction.’).
46 See G. Kirk McDonald and O. Swaak-Goldman (eds), Substantive and Procedural Aspects of
International Criminal Law: The Experience of International and National Courts, Vol. I (Kluwer,
2000), at 57^58; Z. Mills, ‘Does the World Need Knights Errant to Combat Enemies of All
Mankind? Universal Jurisdiction, Connecting Links, and Civil Liability’, 66 Washington and Lee
Law Review (2009) 1315, at 1322.
47 Scharf, supra note 22, argues that aggression is subject to universal jurisdiction by virtue of the
fact that the Nuremberg, Tokyo, and other post-World War II tribunals prosecuted the crime
pursuant to universal jurisdiction. This assumption also appears in the Pinochet proceedings.
Lord Millet in his speech wrote that ‘[t]he Trials of German and Japanese war criminals follow-
ing World War II were based on the principle of universal jurisdiction.’ R. v. Bow Street
Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate & Others, Ex Parte Pinochet Ugarte (No. 3), [1999] 2 All E.R.
97 (H.L.) (per L. Millet). This reasoning remains dicta as it was not contemplated that General
Pinochet would be prosecuted for the crime of aggression.
48 Newton, for one, argues: ‘[T]he ICC is not a court of universal jurisdiction. Universal jurisdic-
tion in its pure form is an all inclusive form of jurisdiction which empowers national courts
operating on a horizontal plane of authority to investigate and/or prosecute a person suspected
of committing a crime anywhere in the world regardless of the nationality of the accused or
the victim, or the absence of any links to the state where the court is located.’ See M. Newton,
‘The Complementarity Conundrum: Are We Watching Evolution or Evisceration?’ 8 Santa
Clara Journal of International Law (2010) 117, at 128.
49 The protective principle is implicated given that the crime of aggression is often deemed to
protect sovereign values.
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universal jurisdiction,50 although this was controversial among the group of
experts involved in that initiative.51 A more defensible conclusion is that cur-
rent law does not provide strong support for the exercise of domestic jurisdic-
tion over the crime of aggression, a fortiori pursuant to universal jurisdiction.
C. Domestic Jurisprudence Involving the Crime of Aggression
Beyond the immediate post-WorldWar II period, there are no domestic criminal
prosecutions for the commission of crimes against the peace, although the
crime has arisen tangentially in some domestic jurisprudence. For example, as
a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Germany participated in
Operation Allied Force in Kosovo, the collective effort to protect Kosovars from
Serbian atrocities. A German court rejected claims brought by German polit-
icians under the code provision prohibiting aggression in connection with the
intervention. The case was dismissed for lack of standing,52 and other requests
to investigate were denied.53 As one commentator noted in regard to the
German proceedings:
Aggressive war was distinguished from a mere violation of the prohibition on the use of
force by the specific intent required, namely to disturb the peaceful coexistence of peoples.
Thus, the benign motives of NATO action were deemed to be sufficient to exculpate the
German government ç an argument usually not sustained under German criminal law.54
Similar complaints involving the Second Gulf War were also rejected in light of
Germany’s minimal involvement in that war.55
The crime of aggression was also central to the British House of Lords case
of R. v. Jones.56 The issue arose in Jones when individuals being prosecuted for
50 Princeton Project on Universal Jurisdiction, The Princeton Principles on Universal Jurisdiction
(2001), Principle 2(1). But see The Cairo-Arusha Principles on Universal Jurisdiction In Respect of
Gross Human Rights Offences: An African Perspective, available online at http://www.kituocha
katiba.org/index2.php?option¼com_docman&task¼doc_view&gid¼116&Itemid¼27 (visited 20
December 2011) (not listing the crime of aggression).
51 See S. Macedo, ‘Commentary’, in S. Macedo (ed.), Universal Jurisdiction: National Courts and the
Prosecution of Serious Crimes Under International Law (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004)
26, at 30 (‘While many argue that aggression constitutes the most serious international
crime, others contend that defining the crime of ‘‘aggression’’ is in practice extremely difficult
and divisive. In the end, ‘‘crimes against peace’’ were included [in the Princeton Principles’
list], despite some disagreement, in part in order to recall the wording of Article 6(a) of the
Nuremberg Charter.’).
52 Bundesverfassungsgericht (BVerfG) (German Federal Constitutional Court), 25 March1999, in 2
Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts (BVerfGE) 5 (1999), available online at http://
www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/es19990325_2bve000599.html (visited 20 December 2011).
53 See A.L. Paulus, ‘Peace Through Justice? The Future of the Crime of Aggression in a Time of
Crisis’, 50 Wayne Law Review (2004) 1, at 27.
54 Ibid.
55 Ibid., at 29 (noting United States’ use of German bases and air space during Operation Iraqi
Freedom). See generally Kre, supra note 39, at 247^249 (discussing prosecutorial reasoning).
56 R. v. Jones et al. [2006] UKHL 16. See generally C.VillarinoVilla, ‘The Crime of Aggression before
the House of Lords ç Chronicle of a Death Foretold’, 4 JICJ (2006) 866. See generally R. Clark,
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aggravated trespass and criminal damage in connection with efforts to impede
British involvement in the Iraq War argued that they were attempting to pre-
vent the commission of a crime, namely, an act of aggression. The House of
Lords affirmed the unavailability of the defence. Lord Bingham of Cornhill
determined that customary international law recognized the crime of aggres-
sion as evidenced by treaties dating to the 1920s, the Nuremberg and Tokyo
proceedings, and the ICC negotiations.57 He rejected the proposition, however,
that customary international law crimes were automatically assimilated into
domestic law so as to trigger the articulated defence.58 Lord Hoffman noted
that the liability of individuals for the crime of aggression is secondary to the
acts of a state, and the courts should not enquire into the ‘discretionary
power’ of the state to use force.59 Lord Mance in his speech noted that not all
public international law crimes are, or should be, incorporated into the domes-
tic penal code.60 On the basis of this collective reasoning, the appeals were
dismissed.
This survey suggests that there is little empirical support for domestic pros-
ecutions of the crime of aggression under any jurisdictional basis. In particu-
lar, it renders the claim that aggression is currently subject to universal
jurisdiction very difficult to sustain under a rigorous application of the classic
formula for customary international law: consistent state practice coupled
with opinio juris. Although states have generally not codified the crime of ag-
gression in their penal codes in the past, it remains to be seen if this trend
will continue now that a consensus definition of the crime has emerged.
D. The Lack of Analogous Crimes in Domestic Law
Absent an express provision penalizing the crime of aggression, there are few
domestic offences that might serve as a charging substitute. To be sure, some
war-related charges (treason, sedition, insurrection, war crimes, violations of
neutrality acts, or espionage) might be deemed to cover the same incident as
an aggression charge before the ICC. These crimes may not, however, cover
the same conduct proscribed by the definition of aggression: ‘the planning,
preparation, initiation or execution :::of an act of aggression’.61 In addition,
many of these crimes are geared toward repressing internal dissention or
non-state action, rather than a state’s cross-border aggressive activity, and so
would not implicate the ICC prohibition of aggression.
Using United States law as an example, several domestic laws could conceiv-
ably address the same incident as an aggression charge, but not precisely the
‘Aggression: A Crime Under Domestic Law?’ New Zealand Law Journal (2006) 349; R. Cryer,
‘Aggression at the Court of Appeal’, 10 Journal of Conflict and Security Law (2005) 209.
57 R. v. Jones et al. [2006] UKHL 16, xx12, 19.
58 Ibid., x 31.
59 Ibid., x65.
60 Ibid., x102.
61 Res. 6, Annex I, Art. 8bis(1).
Par in Parem Imperium Non Habet 145








same conduct. Treason is constitutionally defined at Article III(3) as ‘levying
War against [the United States], or in adhering to their Enemies, giving them
Aid and Comfort’.62 It is statutorily limited to individuals owing allegiance to
the United States and so would not likely cover foreign nationals engaged in
an armed conflict against the United States; nor would it reach the US na-
tionals engaged in an armed conflict abroad.63 More promising, the crime of
seditious conspiracy, which does not require this showing of allegiance,64 pro-
hibits engaging in a conspiracy to levy war against the United States:
If two or more persons in any State or Territory, or in any place subject to the jurisdiction of
the United States, conspire to overthrow, put down, or to destroy by force the Government
of the United States, or to levy war against [it] :::, they shall each be fined under this title
or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both.65
The Neutrality Act would likely not reach the same conduct as the aggression
amendments for lack of state action.66 The Espionage Act penalizes only the
gathering or transmitting of national defence information.67 Many other
war-related provisions in the US law do not provide for criminal penalties. For
example, the Insurrection Act of 1807 is a non-penal provision authorizing
the President to employ state militia or armed forces to suppress rebellion.68
The Alien Enemies Act allows the President to deport resident aliens if their
home countries are at war with the United States.69
Certain terrorism crimes might encompass some of the same conduct that
would give rise to an aggression charge. Under the US law, for example, it is
a federal crime to commit an act of terrorism transcending national
62 US Const., Art. III(3).
63 18 U.S.C. x 2381 allows for the prosecution of those who ‘owing allegiance to the United States,
levies war against them or adheres to their enemies, giving them aid and comfort within the
United States or elsewhere’. US citizen Adam Yahiye Gadahn has been indicted for treason in
connection with terrorist activities and providing aid and comfort to Al Qaeda. See Federal
Bureau of Investigations, Most Wanted Terrorists, available online at http://www.fbi.gov/
wanted/wanted_terrorists/adam-yahiye-gadahn (visited 20 December 2011).
64 U.S. v. Rahman, 189 F.3d 88, 113 (2d Cir. 1999) (noting differences in elements between the
crimes of treason and seditious conspiracy ç including the requirement of a breach of alle-
giance for treason ç in a case involving the 1993 World Trade Centre bombing).
65 18 U.S.C. x 2384. The commission of either treason or this offence can also result in the loss of
US citizenship. 8 U.S.C. x1481.
66 18 U.S.C. x960. That Act reads: ‘Whoever, within the United States, knowingly begins or sets on
foot or provides or prepares a means for or furnishes the money for, or takes part in, any mili-
tary or naval expedition or enterprise to be carried on from thence against the territory or do-
minion of any foreign prince or state, or of any colony, district, or people with whom the
United States is at peace, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than three
years, or both.’
67 18 U.S.C. xx793^794.
68 10 U.S.C. x331 et seq.
69 50 U.S.C. xx 21^24. This statute is a vestige of the infamous Alien & Sedition Acts. See generally
G. Fehlings, ‘Storm on the Constitution: The First Deportation Law’, 10 Tulsa Journal of
Comparative and International Law (2002) 63, at 75 (explaining the differences between the
Alien Act and the Alien Enemies Act).
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boundaries.70 One can imagine an act of aggression giving rise to domestic
charges of using weapons of mass destruction (which are broadly defined),71
engaging in terrorist bombings,72 or employing certain prohibited weapons.73
That said, these crimes might be more likely charged against low- or mid-level
operatives who would not satisfy the leadership clause of the ICC’s aggression
definition. Moreover, many terrorism crimes do not apply to the activities of
armed forces during an armed conflict or activities undertaken by the military
forces of a state in the exercise of their official duties, which would likely ex-
clude acts of state aggression as defined by the ICC Statute.74
Even most war crimes charges will not condemn the same conduct as the
crime of aggression in keeping with the longstanding conceptual distinction
between the jus ad bellum (the rules governing the resort to armed force) and
the jus in bello (the rules governing the conduct of hostilities). By way of excep-
tion, the conduct underlying certain means and methods charges derivative
of Hague law75 might dovetail with the conduct underlying the ‘execution’ of
an act of aggression (as opposed to, for example, the planning or preparation
of an act of aggression).76 Finally, some standard domestic crimes might also
be prosecutable in the event that a state commits an act of aggression.
Presumably, domestic prosecutors could level charges involving many crimes
of violence (murder, torture, criminal damage, etc.) against an individual who
might also be charged with committing the crime of aggression before the ICC
so long as any extraterritoriality requirement was satisfied.77 These charges
might cover the same conduct as the execution of an act of aggression against
another state.
70 18 U.S.C. x 2332b. The statute applies, however, only to acts of international terrorism com-
mitted against any person or property within the United States. Ibid., x 2332b(a)(1).
71 18 U.S.C. x 2332a. This statute protects, inter alia, US nationals and US property inside or out-
side the United States. Ibid., x 2332a(a). It also allows for the prosecution of US nationals who
use weapons of mass destruction abroad. Ibid., x 2332a(b).
72 18 U.S.C. x 2332f. This offence applies to property within the United States, x 2332f(b)(1), and to
terrorist bombings in which the victim or perpetrator is a US national or in which the perpetra-
tor is found in the United States. Ibid., x 2332f(b)(2). It also applies where ‘the offence is com-
mitted in an attempt to compel the US to do or abstain from doing any act.’ Ibid., x
2332f(b)(2)(D).
73 See e.g. 19 U.S.C. x 2332h (prohibiting the use of radiological dispersal devices).
74 Ibid., x 2332f(d). For a discussion of US terrorism laws generally, see B.Van Schaack, ‘Finding the
Tort of Terrorism in International Law’, 28 The Review of Litigation (2008) 381.
75 See e.g. Art. 8(2)(b)(i) ICCSt. (penalizing ‘[i]ntentionally directing attacks against the civilian
population as such :::’).
76 An act of aggression may constitute the widespread and systematic attack serving as a jurisdic-
tional predicate to the crimes against humanity charge. The defendant’s conduct, however,
would have to entail the commission of one of the enumerated acts that constitute crimes
against humanity (murder, etc.).
77 For example, 18 U.S.C. x 1116 criminalizes the commission of murder or manslaughter against
foreign officials, official guests, or internationally protected persons. There is extraterritorial
jurisdiction, inter alia, where the offender is a national of the United States or is afterwards
found in the United States. Ibid., x1116(c).
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3. Problems with Domestic Prosecutions for the
Crime of Aggression
As discussed above, states have generally not endeavoured to assert national
jurisdiction over the crime of aggression. This no doubt reflects the limited
legal support for such proceedings provided by the post-WorldWar II precedent
and contemporary law. In addition, there are cogent policy rationales for
eschewing domestic prosecutions, especially beyond the nationality state.78
These rationales remain compelling even with the codification of the crime of
aggression in the ICC Statute.79
For one, the intense difficulty in reaching a consensus definition of the crime
of aggression and an operative jurisdictional regime reveals the extent to
which the crime raises acute sovereignty concerns.80 The enduring contro-
versy over the crime stems from the fact that, especially as formulated for pur-
poses of the ICC,81 the crime involves more than simply the conduct of an
individual defendant; it directly implicates state action as well in a way that
78 There may also be impartiality concerns when the courts of the nationality state adjudicate ag-
gression charges that hinge on a finding that a predecessor government engaged in an act of
aggression. I am indebted to Sean Murphy for this observation.
79 The United States raised some of these concerns in an intervention in Kampala:
A third risk is that of unjustified domestic prosecutions. Too little attention has yet been
paid to the question of how, if at all, the principle of complementarity would apply to
the crime of aggression. The definition does little to limit the risk that State Parties will
incorporate a definition ç particularly one we believe is flawed ç into their domestic
law, encouraging the possibility that under expansive principles of jurisdiction, govern-
ment officials will be prosecuted for alleged aggression in the courts of another state.
Even if states incorporate an acceptable definition into their domestic law, it is not clear
whether or when it is appropriate for one state to bring its neighbor’s leaders before its
domestic courts for the crime of aggression. Such domestic prosecutions would not be
subject to any of the filters under consideration here, and would ask the domestic
courts of one country to sit in judgment upon the state acts of other countries in a
manner highly unlikely to promote peace and security.
Harold Hongju Koh, Statement at the Review Conference of the International Criminal Court, 4
June 2010, available online at http://www.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/142665.htm (visited
20 December 2011).
80 For discussion of the protracted negotiations surrounding the crime, see S. Barriga et al. (eds),
The Princeton Process on the Crime of Aggression: Materials of the Special Working Group on the
Crime of Aggression, 2003-2009 (Lynn Rienner Publishers, 2009); J. Trahan, ‘The Rome
Statute’s Amendment on the Crime of Aggression: Negotiations at the Kampala Review
Conference’, 11 International Criminal Law Review (2011) 49; and B.Van Schaack, ‘Negotiating at
the Interface of Power & Law: The Crime of Aggression’, 49 Columbia Journal of Transnational
Law (2011) 505.
81 The Charters governing the post-World War II prosecutions defined aggression differently. The
Nuremburg Charter defined aggression as the ‘planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a
war of aggression, or a war in violation of international treaties, agreements or assurances, or
participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the foregoing’.
IMT Charter, supra note 10, Art. 6(a).
148 JICJ 10 (2012), 133^164








other international crimes do not.82 Since the early days of the International
Law Commission’s (ILC) Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security
of Mankind,83 individual responsibility for the crime of aggression has been in-
trinsically and inextricably linked to the commission of aggression by a
state.84 Indeed, the definition of the crime that is slated to be added to the ICC
Statute will require a showing of proof beyond a reasonable doubt that a state
committed an act of aggression as a predicate to assigning individual criminal
responsibility.85 The act of aggression committed by a state is thus an express
element of the offence.86 As such, domestic courts hearing aggression cases
not involving their own nationals will essentially be sitting in judgment over
the acts of a co-equal sovereign. The need to rule on the commission state’s
act of aggression implicates the principle of foreign sovereign immunity and
its underlying philosophy, the maxim par in parem imperium non habet (‘an
equal has no power over an equal’). Justiciability concerns abound where do-
mestic courts find themselves evaluating the legality of a foreign state’s deci-
sion to use force.87
82 Res. 6, Annex I, Art. 8bis(2) (listing state acts of aggression).
83 See II Yearbook of the International Law Commission 151 (1954) (defining acts of aggression with
reference to state action). Indeed, as late as 1984, the International Law Commission (ILC) was
still considering whether the Draft Code would acknowledge the criminal responsibility of
states in addition to that of individuals. See I Yearbook of the International Law Commission 5
(1984); ibid., at 13 (noting that a war of aggression was an act by a state). The centrality of
state action remained constant throughout the ILC’s work on the crime of aggression. See
Report of the International Law Commission on theWork of its Forty-Eighth Session, GAOR 51st
Sess., Suppl. No. 10, UN Doc. A/51/10, at 83, available online at http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/re-
ports/english/A_51_10.pdf (visited 20 December 2011) (hereinafter, ‘1996 Draft Code Report’).
84 1996 Draft Code Report, supra note 83, at 30 (‘[A]ggression attributed to a state is a sine qua non
for the responsibility of an individual for his participation in the crime of aggression. An indi-
vidual cannot incur responsibility for this crime in the absence of aggression committed by a
State.’). As Lord Bingham reasoned in Jones:
A charge of aggression, if laid against an individual in a domestic court, would involve
determination of his responsibility as a leader but would presuppose commission of the
crime by his own state or a foreign state. Thus resolution of the charge would (unless
the issue had been decided by the Security Council or some other third party) call for a
decision on the culpability in going to war either of Her Majesty’s Government or a for-
eign government, or perhaps both if the states had gone to war as allies. But there are
well-established rules that the courts will be very slow to review the exercise of preroga-
tive powers in relation to the conduct of foreign affairs and the deployment of the
armed services, and very slow to adjudicate upon rights arising out of transactions
entered into between sovereign states on the plane of international law.
R. v. Jones et al., [2006] UKHL 16, x30.
85 Res. 6, Annex I, Art. 8bis(2).
86 Res. 6, Annex II, Amendments to the Elements of Crimes, Element 3 (‘The act of aggres-
sion :::was committed.’). The crime of aggression can be conceptualized as a result crime in
that the actus reus is defined in terms of a prohibited consequence.
87 See e.g. Saltany v. Reagan, 886 F.2d 438 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (rejecting case by Libyan nationals
arguing for the illegality of US and British airstrikes on Libya). Domestic courts will even re-
frain from evaluating decisions to use force by their own state on non-justiciability grounds.
In the United States, see e.g. DaCosta v. Laird, 471 F.2d 1146 (2d Cir. 1973) (dismissing complaint
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While the domestic prosecution of all international crimes may strain inter-
national relations, prosecuting the crime of aggression domestically in situ-
ations other than following a change of regime88 will inevitably generate
intense charges of politicization from within and outside the prosecuting
state.89 Domestic aggression cases will no doubt exacerbate relations between
states involved in situations already disrupted by a putative act of aggression.90
Third states will inevitably take sides, and retaliatory charges in the nature of
‘lawfare’ may be levelled against the officials of the charging state.91 Politicized
filed by member of the armed forces seeking to bar military actions without congressional au-
thorization inVietnam); Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 484 F.2d 1307 (2d Cir. 1973) (same with respect
to Cambodia). Beyond the United States, see e.g. Sakata v. Japan (‘Sunakawa Case’), Case No.
1959, 13 Keishu 3224 (Sup. Ct. GB Dec. 16, 1959), translated in C.J. Milhaupt et al. (eds), The
Japanese Legal System: Cases, Codes, and Commentary (Foundation Press, 2006), at 213^216
(case challenging the establishment of the Self Defence Forces dismissed on political question
grounds). Several cases proceeded in Europe challenging involvement in Operation Desert
Storm or Operation Iraqi Freedom. See e.g. Grundlovskomiteen 2003 vedr. Irak-krigen, Press
Release from the High Court of Eastern Denmark, 11 April 2007, available online at http://www
.gk2003.dk/inenglish_pressrelease_2007april11.html (visited 20 December 2011) (announcing
dismissal of case on standing grounds); Horgan v. AnTaoiseach, [2003] 2 ILRM 357 (Ir.) (dismiss-
ing case on justiciability grounds); Conseil d’E¤ tat, No. 321470, 15 October 2008 (Fr.) (holding
that the decision to maintain troops abroad qualified as a non-justiciable acte de gouvernement).
88 A good example of a statute limiting jurisdiction to the state’s own nationals may be found in
draft legislation from New Zealand. See International Non-Aggression and Lawful Use of Force
Bill (Member’s Bill), Parliament of New Zealand (2009), available online at http://www
.legislation.govt.nz/bill/member/2009/0062/latest/DLM2252903.html (visited 20 December
2011). This draft text provided:
(1) It is unlawful for a New Zealand leader to plan, prepare, initiate or execute an act of ag-
gression which by its character, gravity and scale, constitutes a manifest violation of the
Charter of the United Nations, in the event that such an act of aggression is committed.
(2) Every person who breaches subsection (1) commits the crime of aggression, and is liable
on conviction on indictment to a maximum sentence of 10 years’ imprisonment.
Ibid., at x 5. The bill was defeated 64^58 at its first reading in Parliament (apparently due in part
to the requirement that the Attorney General be consulted before any proposed troop commit-
ment), and has not been reintroduced. See [2009] 657 NZPD 6818 (N.Z.), available online at
http://www.parliament.nz/NR/rdonlyres/44B784A0-529B-4EA4-99FD-ADCD27D36400/
191021/49HansD_200909295.pdf (visited 20 December 2011).
89 T. McHenry, ‘Complementarity Issues’, 2011 ASIL Proceedings (forthcoming 2012) 153, at 155.
Even where prosecutors are not part of the executive branch, aggression charges are likely to
be viewed as politically motivated.
90 Murphy argues: ‘If [aggression] is criminalized in national law then, when a conflict erupts,
each side presumably will indict and perhaps prosecute the leaders of the other side for aggres-
sion. How will that help matters? Doing so would seem simply to raise the stakes for both
sides in not backing down and not finding a political solution to the conflict. ::: [If] third
states ::: proceed with prosecutions ::: [i]s it really better?’ S. Murphy,The Crime of Aggression As
Adopted by the ICC First Review Conference: A Step Forward? 15 October 2010, at 10-11 (unpub-
lished manuscript on file with the author). The situations involving Georgia and Russia, North
and South Korea, India and Pakistan, and Ethiopia and Somalia, provide a handful of examples
of situations unlikely to be pacified by domestic prosecutions for the crime of aggression.
91 See generally C.J. Dunlap, Jr., ‘LawfareToday: A Perspective’, 3 Yale Journal of International Affairs
(2008) 147.
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trials may generate calls that the ICC should step in to protect a defendant from
an over-zealous national prosecutor.92
Domestic prosecutions for the crime of aggression will not benefit from the
procedural regime ç including painstakingly negotiated judicial and political
controls ç established by the ASP to manage prosecutions of the crime of ag-
gression.93 When an investigation is triggered by either a state party referral
or a proprio motu investigation by the Prosecutor pursuant to Articles 13(a)
and (c) of the ICC Statute, the crime of aggression will be subject to two alter-
native jurisdictional filters ç the Security Council and the Pre-Trial Division
of the Court, which operate in tandem ç to determine whether the predicate
act of state aggression has occurred.94 Neither pre-trial determination is subse-
quently binding on the Court, which will establish the existence of an act of ag-
gression anew at trial under the terms of the Statute and the penal burden of
proof.95 This pre-trial determination, however, will undoubtedly exert consid-
erable evidentiary pull. Once a prosecution is initiated by any means, the
Court is also subject to further oversight by the Security Council,96 which can
defer prosecutions for the crime when they might exacerbate breaches of inter-
national peace and security or otherwise interfere with measures undertaken
by the Council pursuant to the United Nations Charter. None of these proced-
ural hurdles would apply to domestic prosecutions for the crime of aggression
unless specifically incorporated into domestic law.97
Prosecutions before the Court will apply a consensus penal definition, com-
plete with enumerated elements98 and carefully negotiated interpretive
92 K.J. Heller, ‘The Shadow Side of Complementarity: The Effect of Article 17 of the Rome Statute
on National Due Process’, 17 Criminal Law Forum (2006) 255 (exploring whether the ICC could
assert jurisdiction where a state will not guarantee due process to an accused).
93 P.Wrange,‘The Principle of Complementarity under the Rome Statute and its Interplay with the
Crime of Aggression’, in R. Belleli (ed.), Proceedings of the Conference on International
Criminal Justice, Turin, May 14^18, 2007, 57, at 59, x 13, (‘Many States would probably not feel
duty-bound under international law to wait for a decision by the Council.’).
94 See Res. 6, Annex I, O.P. 3.
95 Res. 6, Annex I, Art. 15bis(9). See also Art. 66(3) ICCSt. (‘In order to convict the accused, the
Court must be convinced of the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.’).
96 Art. 16 ICCSt. Theoretically, of course, the Security Council could also order a UN member to
halt a domestic prosecution for the crime of aggression on the ground that the proceedings
constituted a threat to international peace and security. See UN Charter, Art. 41. P. Wrange,
‘The Crime of Aggression and Complementarity’, in R. Bellelli (ed.), International Criminal
Justice: Law and Practice from the Rome Statute to its Review (Ashgate, 2010) 591, at 603
(querying whether the Security Council could ex ante restrict the right to prosecute the crime
of aggression domestically in a broad ‘law making’ resolution).
97 Indeed, if a state is intent on codifying the crime of aggression, at a minimum it should con-
sider limiting prosecutions to situations in which the Security Council has declared the com-
mission of an act of aggression by the relevant state. See Wrange, supra note 93, at 60, x 14
(noting that states might ‘unilaterally take a cautious approach, due to a perceived need of pol-
itical legitimacy through the backing of the Council.’); also, Wrange, supra note 96, at
601^603 (noting that there is no legal requirement that states await a Security Council deter-
mination, but that they could agree between themselves to restrict the right of domestic
jurisdiction).
98 Res. 6, Annex II.
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understandings.99 Legislators incorporating the crime into national penal
codes may drop or change definitional elements of the crime, enabling more ex-
pansive prosecutions than have been deemed acceptable by the ASP. For ex-
ample, states may not adopt the leadership element,100 which significantly
limits the calibre of defendants who may be prosecuted before the ICC.101
Removing that element may render national legislators and policymakers, mili-
tary officers with operational or tactical command, or even foot soldiers vul-
nerable to prosecution for the crime. In the alternative, states may tinker
with, or even eliminate, the threshold qualifier ‘manifest’, which is meant to
prevent the ICC from pursuing cases that are not sufficiently grave or that
involve state conduct whose illegality under the United Nations Charter frame-
work is uncertain.102 More drastically, perhaps, states may allow for prosecu-
tions for attempted aggression103 or they may drop the predicate requirement
that there be proof beyond a reasonable doubt that a state committed an act
of aggression, perhaps on the ground that it is inappropriate for one state to
make such an adjudication vis-a' -vis another state.104 Removing this condition
precedent may unfairly subject government officials to prosecution for the
crime of aggression even in the absence of a determination that their state
committed an act of aggression. This result would deprive defendants of the de-
fence that no act of aggression was committed. Legislators may even extend
the notion of the crime of aggression to non-state action and actors, well
beyond what is contemplated by the amendments to the ICC Statute.105 To be
99 Res. 6, Annex III. Some uncertainty remains over the authoritativeness of these
Understandings. See K.J. Heller, ‘The Uncertain Legal Status of the Aggression Understand-
ings’, in this issue of the Journal.
100 The crime of aggression will only be chargeable before the ICC against ‘persons in a position
effectively to exercise control over or to direct the political or military action of a State’. See
Res. 6, Annex I, O.P. 5 (setting forth proposed amendment to Art. 25). It is not clear if this
element is inherent to the crime of aggression or a jurisdictional limitation applicable only
to the ICC. The ILC assumed it was inherent to the offence. See ILC, Report of the
International Law Commission on the Work of its Second Session, 5 June to 29 July 1950, UN
Doc. A/1316, at 13.
101 See Reisinger Coracini, supra note 3, at 736 (noting that many domestic statutes do not limit
their reach to individuals occupying a leadership position).
102 Art. 8bis(1) defines the crime of aggression as ‘the planning, preparation, initiation or execu-
tion :::of an act of aggression which, by its character, gravity and scale, constitutes a manifest
violation of the Charter of the United Nations’. (Emphasis added). The interpretive
Understandings reinforce this gravity threshold, but would not bind states engaged in domes-
tic prosecutions.
103 The ICC will have jurisdiction only if the act of aggression is actually consummated. For de-
bates over the inclusion of attempts to commit aggression, see Informal Inter-Sessional
Meeting of the Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression, ICC-ASP/3/SWGCA/INF.1
(June 2004), reprinted in Barriga et al., supra note 80, at 198, 204.
104 See Donat Cattin, supra note 42, at 4 (arguing that ‘domestic criminal courts are simply man-
dated to apply the principle of individual criminal responsibility, not principles of State re-
sponsibility that would relate to acts of States, including aggressive wars.’).
105 It was always contemplated that the crime of aggression would be defined in terms of
state action. See generally B. Van Schaack, ‘The Grass That Gets Trampled When
Elephants Fight: Will the Codification of the Crime of Aggression Protect Women?’
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sure, national legislators have a fair amount of leeway in incorporating inter-
national law into their domestic systems, and limitations cannot be pre-
sumed.106 That said, the crime of aggression is one area of international law
in which the ASP and the rest of the international community should particu-
larly guard against fragmentation and incoherence.107
Finally, domestic prosecutions will face a host of logistical and practical
problems that may be more acute in the aggression context than with respect
to other international crimes. These include how to gain access to classified in-
formation, how to address the state secrets doctrine and assertions of executive
privileges,108 how to gain custody of an accused, and how to obtain cooper-
ation from third states.109 These obstacles will complicate prosecutions and
strain the mutual cooperation regimes in place between states. By virtue of
Article 27,110 the ICC is not impeded by common law personal or sovereign
immunities, such as head of state immunity,111 diplomatic immunity112 and
their analogues.113 Presumably, if states retain the leadership clause in domes-
tic definitions of the crime, many domestic cases will be barred by these im-
munity doctrines.114 There may, however, be a category of individual who
would be vulnerable to prosecution because he or she satisfies the leadership
clause by virtue of occupying ‘a position effectively to exercise control over or
to direct the political or military action of a State’, but would not be entitled to
any form of common law immunity. Nor is the ICC bound by abstention or
non-justiciability doctrines that might complicate domestic proceedings, such
as the act of state115 and political question doctrines.116
15 UCLA Journal of International Law and Foreign Affairs (2012) (forthcoming) (arguing that
the definition of aggression contains blind spots that do not reflect the diversity of threats to
international peace and security in contemporary international relations).
106 The Case of the S.S.‘‘Lotus’’ (France v. Turkey), 1927 P.C.I.J. (Ser. A) No. 10 (7 September 1927).
107 See ILC, Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and
Expansion of International Law, Report of the Study Group of the ILC finalized by Martti
Koskenniemi, UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.682, 13 April 2006.
108 See Art. 72 ICCSt. (‘Protection of National Security Information’).
109 McHenry, supra note 89, at 155. To be sure, these concerns are applicable in many extraterri-
torial prosecutions for international crimes. The need to prove that a state committed an act
of aggression, however, suggests special challenges.
110 Art. 27 ICCSt. (‘Irrelevance of Official Capacity’).
111 See generally R. v. Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate & Others, Ex Parte Pinochet
Ugarte (No. 3), [1999] 2 All E.R. 97 (H.L.) (discussing head of state and other immunities).
112 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Art. 31, 18 April 1961, 500 UNTS 95.
113 SeeArrestWarrant of 11April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium), 2002 ICJ 3, at
54 (14 February 2001) (extending head of state immunity to an incumbent Minister of
Foreign Affairs).
114 Wrange, supra note 93, at 58, x6.
115 But see Wrange, supra note 96, at 595 (opining that the act of state doctrine covers only
actions taken within the territory of a state and that acts of aggression by definition cross
international borders).
116 Decision on the Defence Motion for InterlocutoryAppeal on Jurisdiction,Tadic¤ (IT-94-1-AR72),
Appeals Chamber, 2 October 2005, xx 23^25 (rejecting political question doctrine as a defence
to prosecution).
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A. The Temptation to Codify the Crime of Aggression
Notwithstanding these concerns, given the lack of express provisions con-
demning the crime of aggression, or obvious analogues thereto, as states par-
ties ratify or accept the aggression amendments, they will inevitably consider
whether to domesticate the crime of aggression.117 There is no express require-
ment within the ICC Statute obliging states parties to harmonize their domestic
penal codes with the treaty.118 The Preamble affirms that the prosecution of
serious crimes should be effectively prosecuted by ‘taking measures at the na-
tional level’ and ‘enhancing international cooperation’;119 recalls that ‘it is the
duty of every state to exercise its criminal jurisdiction over those responsible
for international crimes’;120 and emphasizes that the ICC is to be ‘complemen-
tary to national criminal jurisdictions’.121 These preambular provisions recall
pre-existing obligations under general international law rather than create
new treaty-based obligations. Indeed, the latter clause is directed at ‘every
State’ (and not just states parties), implying that no new duties are created by
the Statute. The only mandatory language regarding domestic legislation in
the treaty concerns state cooperation122 and the obligation to assert jurisdic-
tion over offences against the administration of justice.123
Although the domestic incorporation of ICC crimes is not mandated, as part
of the process of ratification, states parties have tended to update their penal
codes to be largely consistent with the ICC Statute. One of the most important
reasons for doing so is to ensure that they may take full advantage of the prin-
ciple of complementarity. The principle of complementarity may thus encour-
age states to codify the crime of aggression in order to preserve their domestic
117 Indeed, non-party states may also contemplate codification in order to preserve their ability to
exercise domestic jurisdiction.
118 R. Rastan, ‘Complementarity: Contest or Collaboration’, in M. Bergsmo (ed.), Complementarity
and the Exercise of Universal Jurisdiction for Core International Crimes (Torkel Opsahl Academic
EPublisher, 2010) 83, at 93 (noting that the Rome Statute ‘does not require domestication of
the applicable crimes by way of implementing legislation’ but that the Statute’s admissibility
provisions will nonetheless require the Court ‘to engage in a qualitative assessment over the
adequacy of national law to repress the conduct alleged by the Prosecutor.’). But see
J. Kleffner, ‘The Impact of Complementarity on National Implementation of Substantive
International Criminal Law’, 1 JICJ (2003) 86, at 92-94 (arguing an implied obligation to
codify the ICC crimes to effectuate the object and purpose of the ICCSt.).
119 Preambular clause 4, ICCSt. (‘Affirming that the most serious crimes of concern to the interna-
tional community as a whole must not go unpunished and that their effective prosecution
must be ensured by taking measures at the national level and by enhancing international
cooperation’).
120 Ibid., at clause 6.
121 Ibid., at clause 10.While this language calls for domestic prosecutions, it falls just shy of an
express endorsement of the exercise of universal jurisdiction over ICC crimes.
122 The Statute requires states parties to enact procedures in national law to enable them to co-
operate with the Court, especially with respect to the arrest and surrender of suspects. See
Arts 88 and 89(1) ICCSt.
123 Art. 70(4)(a) ICCSt.
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prosecutorial capacities and priorities.124 The ASP addressed this potential
eventuality in interpretive Understandings adopted alongside the definition of
aggression, as discussed in the next section.
4. Complementarity and Aggression
Given the legal and policy concerns outlined above about domestic prosecu-
tions for the crime of aggression, it would have been ideal had the ASP endeav-
oured to grant the ICC exclusive jurisdiction over the crime of aggression.
This was the approach the ILC originally adopted in early drafts of the ICC
Statute. In the negotiations leading up to the 2010 Review Conference, how-
ever, negotiators decided, with little actual debate, that the crime of aggression
would be subject to the principle of complementarity to the same extent as
the atrocity crimes. Nonetheless, in the negotiated Understandings, negotiators
cautioned against incorporating the crime into the world’s penal codes. This
approach reflects a recognition that the principle of complementarity might
apply differently to the crime of aggression than it does to other atrocity
crimes.
A. The Principle of Complementarity
By way of background, the ICC Statute envisions situations of concurrent juris-
diction between the Court and domestic courts at two points: when a state is
in the process of prosecuting an individual pursuant to its domestic law and
when a state has already prosecuted a potential ICC defendant.125 The first
situation implicates the principle of complementarity. The latter requires a con-
sideration of the principle of ne bis in idem, or double jeopardy.126
The unit of analysis for the principle of complementarity is a ‘case’,
which implies the identification of particular criminal conduct by a particular
124 See Kleffner, supra note 118, at 90 (positing a ‘normative force of complementarity’ and
arguing that the principle of complementarity encourages all states to incorporate the ICC
crimes).
125 Arts 17-19 ICCSt. For a cogent discussion of the question of concurrence of charges at the vari-
ous stages of a prosecution, see R. Rastan, ‘Situations and Cases: Defining the Parameters’, in
C. Stahn and M.M. El Zeidy (eds), The International Criminal Court and Complementarity: From
Theory to Practice,Vol. I (Cambridge University Press, 2011) 421, at 437^444.
126 Art. 20 ICCSt. Although outside the scope of this article, it is worth considering whether
double jeopardy would attach to a domestic prosecution for war crimes or crimes against hu-
manity vis-a' -vis the ICC if the crime of aggression was also implicated. According to the prin-
ciple of upward ne bis in idem, the Court is barred from prosecuting defendants for the same
conduct (as compared to the same crime, the unit of analysis for downward ne bis in idem) for
which they stood trial in a domestic court. See generally L.E. Carter, ‘The Principle of
Complementarity and the International Criminal Court: The Role of Ne Bis In Idem’, 8 Santa
Clara Journal of International Law (2010) 165.
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suspect.127 Indeed, in a draft policy statement, the Prosecutor has indicated
that the complementarity analysis requires a case-specific assessment and
does not involve the Court passing judgment on a national judicial system as
a whole.128 Thus, once the Prosecutor identifies a case that he or she intends
to prosecute (encompassing a particular crime or crime base and a particular
suspect), the Prosecutor must examine whether any national authorities are
conducting or have conducted proceedings in relation to the same person for
the same conduct.129 Theoretically, for this same conduct test, if a domestic
court were prosecuting an individual for ordinary murder, the Court should
not proceed with charges of wilful killing as a war crime or murder as a
crime against humanity. Or, if a domestic court were prosecuting an individual
for killing civilians as a war crime, the Court should not prosecute the same in-
dividual for the crime against humanity of murder.Whether complementarity
is appropriately premised on the same conduct test or rather the precise label-
ling of an offence has led to a sharp divergence of scholarly opinion that
awaits clarification from the Court.130
It is clear that an ongoing domestic prosecution may not necessarily trigger
deferral by the Court for other crimes that may be charged against the same in-
dividual for the totality of his or her conduct. The Lubanga case provides a
stark example of the way in which the Court can assert jurisdiction when
127 See Decision on the Prosecutor’s Application for aWarrant of Arrest, Article 58, Lubanga Dyilo
(ICC-01/04-01/06-8-US-Corr), Pre-Trial Chamber I, 10 February 2006 (hereinafter, ‘Lubanga
Dyilo’), at x 31 (‘it is a condition sine qua non for a case arising from the investigation of a situ-
ation to be inadmissible that national proceedings encompass both the person and the con-
duct which is the subject of the case before the Court.’); Decision on the Prosecution
Application Under Article 58(7) of the Statute, Ahmad Harun and Ali Kushayb (ICC-02/05-01/
07), Pre-Trial Chamber I, 27 April 2007, x 24. See also ICC, OTP, Policy Paper on Preliminary
Examinations (Draft) (4 October 2010), available online at http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdon-
lyres/E278F5A2-A4F9-43D7-83D2-6A2C9CF5D7D7/282515/OTP_Draftpolicypaperonpreli-
minaryexaminations04101.pdf (hereinafter, ‘2010 Draft Policy Paper’), at 10 (defining ‘case’ to
encompass ‘an identified set of incidents, individuals and charges’) (visited 7 November 2011).
128 See 2010 Draft Policy Paper, supra note 127, at 10.
129 Several defendants being prosecuted in connection with the Kenya situation have argued that
the definition of a ‘case’ for the purposes of an admissibility challenge should be broader
than the same person/same conduct test, which applies to ne bis in idem cases, because the
charges confirmed might differ from those presented at the summons stage. See Decision on
the Application by the Government of Kenya Challenging the Admissibility of the Case
Pursuant to Article 19(2)(b) of the Statute, Ruto et al. (ICC-01/09-01/11-101), Pre-Trial
Chamber II, 30 May 2011, x 21. This issue, and the approach the ICC should take vis-a' -vis the
labelling of crimes as ordinary or international, is the subject of appeal in the Kenya admissi-
bility challenge.
130 See Newton, supra note 48, at 150 (noting that an ICC Prosecutor could ‘use the form of do-
mestic charges as a pretext to exert ICC authority.’). Some scholars have asserted what Heller
describes as the ‘hard mirror thesis’, which posits that a domestic prosecutor’s characteriza-
tion of an international crime as an ordinary crime would per se indicate unwillingness or
inability on the part of the state and thus render a case admissible. K.J. Heller, ‘A
Sentence-Based Theory of Complementarity’, available online at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id¼1857428 (visited 21 December 2011). See e.g. D. Sedman, ‘Should the
Prosecution of Ordinary Crimes in Domestic Jurisdictions Satisfy the Complementarity
Principle?’ in Stahn and Van den Herik (eds), supra note 5, 266.
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there is an incongruity between the operative domestic charges and the
charges sought by the ICC Prosecutor.131 In 2005, the Democratic Republic of
Congowas ostensibly prosecutingThomas Lubanga Dyilo for crimes against hu-
manity, genocide, and other grave crimes;132 nonetheless, the Prosecutor sought
to indict him for the crime of conscripting and using children in armed conflict
ç arguably a lesser crime than the charges pending before the domestic
courts.133 In its admissibility ruling, the Pre-Trial Chamber held that because
none of the domestic charges encompassed the use of child soldiers, the case
was admissible.134 This example suggests that for complementarity to render a
case inadmissible before the ICC, there must be a high degree of concurrence be-
tween the domestic charging instrument and the ICC indictment under
contemplation.
B. The Application of Complementarity to the Crime of Aggression
Although complementarity has been central to the ICC since its inception, the
application of the principle to the crime of aggression has raised special con-
cerns.135 The ILC in its work on precursors to the ICC Statute treated the
crime of aggression differently than the other core crimes when it came to
complementarity. Article 8 of the 1996 Draft Code of Offences Against the
Peace and Security of Mankind, entitled ‘Establishment of Jurisdiction’, stated
as follows:
Without prejudice to the jurisdiction of an international criminal court, each State Party
shall take such measures as may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction over the crimes
131 Lubanga Dyilo, supra note 127; Annex I to Decision Concerning Pre-Trial Chamber I’s Decision
of 10 February 2006 and the Incorporation of Documents into the Record of the Case against
Mr. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Lubanga Dyilo (ICC-01/04-01/06-8-Corr), 28 February 2005.
132 See Lubanga Dyilo, supra note 127, at xx 33, 36 (setting forth pending domestic charges). It is
unclear from the record how much progress had been made on pursuing these charges or if
they were filed primarily to provide a basis for justifying the continued detention of the
accused.
133 Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, Lubanga Dyilo (ICC-01/04-01/06), Pre-Trial
Chamber I, 29 January 2007, xx 30^40.
134 Lubanga, supra note 127, xx 38^40. See W.A. Schabas, ‘Prosecutorial Discretion v. Judicial
Activism at the International Criminal Court’, 6 JICJ (2008) 731, at 741^745 (critiquing asser-
tion of jurisdiction under the circumstances). The Court also noted that there had been vir-
tual inaction with respect to the charges at issue. See Lubanga, supra note 127, x 34 (noting
letter from the DRC indicating it would be unable to proceed with initial charges). See gener-
ally Rastan, supra note 125, at 446, note 76 (arguing that the DRC was not actively prosecut-
ing Lubanga Dyilo for any charges and that the Court was correct in taking the case on that
ground). This confirmation of admissibility may also reflect the reality that a compliant DRC
was willing to outsource Lubanga Dyilo’s prosecution, and Court personnel were hungry for
their first case. See Schabas, ibid., at 744.
135 See M.M. El Zeidy, ‘The Principle of Complementarity: A New Machinery to Implement
International Criminal Law’, 23 Michigan Journal of International Law (2002) 869, at 973,
notes 406^407 (arguing that the principle of complementarity would not apply to the crime
of aggression).
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set out in articles 17 [genocide], 18 [crimes against humanity], 19 [crimes against UN per-
sonnel] and 20 [war crimes], irrespective of where or by whom those crimes were com-
mitted. Jurisdiction over the crime set out in article 16 [aggression] shall rest with an
international criminal court. However, a State referred to in article 16 is not precluded
from trying its nationals for the crime set out in that article.136
This text thus envisioned jurisdiction over the crime of aggression to be all but
exclusive before the future international court.137 The only exception contem-
plated was in the case of a state prosecuting its own nationals for the crime,
presumably after a change of regime.138 This provision thus excluded the exer-
cise of jurisdiction by the victim state exercising territorial, protective, or pas-
sive personality jurisdiction as well as by third states.139 The ILC’s
commentary explained its approach as follows:
An individual cannot incur responsibility for this crime in the absence of aggression com-
mitted by a State. Thus, a court cannot determine the question of individual criminal re-
sponsibility for this crime without considering as a preliminary matter the question of
aggression by a State. The determination by a national court of one State of the question of
whether another State had committed aggression would be contrary to the fundamental
principle of international law par in parem imperium non habet. Moreover, the exercise of jur-
isdiction by the national court of a State which entails consideration of the commission of
aggression by another State would have serious implications for international relations
and international peace and security.140
Similarly, Article 9 of the 1996 Draft Code excluded the crime of aggression
from the extradition regime envisioned by the draft text: ‘Without prejudice to
the jurisdiction of an international criminal court, the State Party in the terri-
tory of which an individual alleged to have committed a crime set out in
136 1996 Draft Code Report, supra note 83, at 27. See also ILC, Report of the International Law
Commission on the work of its forty-seventh session (2 May^21 July 1995), UN Doc. A/50/10, at
22 (noting the argument that ‘the crime of aggression was inherently unsuitable for trial by
national courts and should instead be dealt with only by an international court.’). The ILC
would also have established more express duties on states parties to codify ICC crimes and
acknowledged the propriety of universal jurisdiction over the atrocity crimes. Ibid., at 29.
137 The commentary makes clear that the Commission considered that international law already
entitled any state party to exercise jurisdiction over an individual allegedly responsible for
war crimes, crimes against humanity or genocide. 1996 Draft Code Report, supra note 83, at
29.
138 This jurisdiction was framed as permissive. 1996 Draft Code Report, supra note 83, at 32.
139 Ibid., at 30 (noting the text’s ‘singular exception’ for the exercise of nationality jurisdiction by
the state that committed the act of aggression).
140 Ibid., at 30. The report also notes that the nationality state ‘is the only State which could deter-
mine the responsibility of a leader for the crime of aggression without being required to also
consider the question of aggression by another State. ::: [T]he exercise of national jurisdiction
by a State with respect to the responsibility of its nationals for aggression would not have
the same negative consequences for international relations or international peace and secur-
ity as the exercise of national jurisdiction in the same respect.’ Ibid., at 30. From the records,
it is unclear if the ILC considered itself to be codifying existing international law on this
point. Ibid. Wrange, supra note 96, at 599 (opining that the ILC adopted a more restrictive
view on policy grounds).
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article 17, 18, 19 or 20 is found shall extradite or prosecute that individual.’141
The aggression provision, then contained within Article 16, is not listed.142
This regime thus eliminated pure territorial jurisdiction over the crime ç the
most standard ground for exercising criminal law jurisdiction.143
Contrary to the approach of the ILC, the SpecialWorking Group on the Crime
of Aggression144 concluded that the principle of complementarity would osten-
sibly apply mutatis mutandis to the crime of aggression.145 During the
pre-Review Conference negotiations, delegates indicated that it would be for
the Court to interpret the relevant provisions.146 In Kampala, however, this
issue was revisited in interpretive Understandings that were ultimately at-
tached to the final adopting resolution.147 The final text built on existing lan-
guage in the Review Conference materials concerning the propriety of the
exercise of domestic jurisdiction over the crime of aggression in the event an
amendment to the Statute was adopted. In Kampala, the first Conference
Room Paper on the Crime of Aggression contained a draft Understanding to
the effect that:
4bis. It is understood that the amendments address the definition of the crime of aggression
and the conditions under which the Court shall exercise jurisdiction with respect to
this crime for the purpose of this Statute only. The amendments shall, in accordance
with article 10 of the Rome Statute, not be interpreted as limiting or prejudicing in
any way existing or developing rules of international law for purposes other than this
Statute. The amendments shall therefore not be interpreted as creating the right or
141 Ibid., at 30.
142 As an indirect damper on the exercise of domestic jurisdiction over the crime of aggression,
the ASP might also have adopted language to the effect that states party would not seek or
grant the extradition of individuals generally, or alternatively on the basis of a ground other
than nationality jurisdiction, if they are to be prosecuted for the crime of aggression. See
Art. 90 ICCSt. (governing competing requests for jurisdiction). This approach was not
contemplated.
143 But see Strapatsas, supra note 5, at 453 (noting that ‘an aggressed state :::has every legal right
to exercise its criminal jurisdiction over the crime of aggression by virtue of the ‘‘territorial
character of criminal law’’.’).
144 As early as 2004, delegates acknowledged they might have to revisit the complementarity
provisions once a definition of aggression was reached. See Informal Inter-Sessional Meeting
of the Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression, Doc. ICC-ASP/3/SWGCA/INF.1
(June 2004), in Barriga et al., supra note 80, at 198, 201^202. However, little attention was
paid to this issue during the negotiations given delegates’ preoccupation with defining the
crime and devising an appropriate jurisdictional framework. See Strapatsas, supra note 5, at
450 (noting mixed signals within the aggression amendments travaux as to the applicability
of the principle of complementarity to aggression).
145 Report of the inter-sessional meeting of the Special Working Group on the Crime of
Aggression, Doc. ICC-ASP/3/25 (2004) (hereinafter, ‘2004 Report’), in Barriga et al., supra
note 80, at 198, 201^202 (‘There was general agreement that no problems seemed to arise
from the current provisions [on complementarity] being applicable to the crime of
aggression.’).
146 Ibid., at 202.
147 Res.6, Annex III. For a deeper discussion of the Understandings, see C. Kre et al.,‘Negotiating
the Understandings on the Crime of Aggression’, in S. Barriga and C. Kre (eds), The Travaux
Pre¤ paratoires of the Crime of Aggression (Cambridge University Press, 2011) 81.
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obligation to exercise domestic jurisdiction with respect to an act of aggression committed
by another State.148
The original formulation of this Understanding accomplished several purposes:
it identified the definition of the crime as relevant to the ICC only; it did not au-
thorize or require domestic incorporation of the crime; and, it did not parse be-
tween the various bases of extraterritorial jurisdiction, but simply indicated
that the amendments to the Statute should not be cited as a legal basis
for states to assert domestic jurisdiction over individuals accused of orchestrat-
ing an act of aggression committed by another state. The reference to ‘by an-
other state’ implies that the exercise of active nationality jurisdiction was
considered less problematic.
During the Kampala negotiations, the United States delegation proposed
three changes to this language: (1) The addition of a reference to ‘act of aggres-
sion’ in the first sentence alongside ‘crime of aggression’; (2) the inclusion of
an assertion that the aggression amendments do not constitute a definition of
these terms under customary international law; and (3) a separation of the
third sentence into a separate Understanding (and a removal of the word
‘therefore’) to reflect the fact that this statement addresses a different concern
than the first two sentences of this text (i.e. the issues of definition versus juris-
dictional competency). In an intervention in a plenary session, a member of
the United States delegation explained that the point of the first two of these
proposed changes was to further emphasize that the amendments would be
adopted solely for the purpose of prosecutions under the Rome Statute and
that there is a divergence of views among states about as to whether the defin-
itions of ‘crime of aggression’ in Article 8bis(1) and ‘act of aggression’ in
Article 8bis(2) reflect customary international law.149 The ultimate goal of
these proposals was to undermine any tendency to refer to these definitions
as evidence of existing customary international law or any progressive devel-
opment of the law. The last change was meant to signal a separate point: that
ratification or acceptance of the amendments will not empower or oblige
states to incorporate the crime of aggression into their domestic codes or to
launch domestic prosecutions for the crime.
Claus Kre of the German delegation moderated a breakout session on these
proposals in which delegates embraced the same consensus-oriented approach
that governed the plenary sessions. To be sure, the complete dynamics of the
negotiations remain opaque, but the proposed language in 4bis met with little
public discussion or resistance, except in so far as the words ‘customary inter-
national law’ were ultimately not included in the final text. The new language
148 Annex III, Conference Room Paper on the Crime of Aggression, RC/WGCA/1/Rev.1, 5 June
2010. This language was drawn from a prior Non-Paper by the Chair circulated in advance of
the Review Conference. See Non-Paper by the Chair: Further Elements for a Solution on the
Crime of Aggression, RC/WGCA/2, 25 May 2010. Art. 10 ICCSt. states that nothing in Part 2
(concerned with jurisdiction, admissibility, and applicable law) is meant to influence ‘existing
or developing rules of international law for purposes other than this Statute’.
149 Intervention byWilliam Lietzau, DeputyAssistant Secretary of Defense, United States, 7 June
2010 (unpublished) (on file with the author).
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of Understanding 4bis later appeared in a Non-Paper by the President.150 In the
final package of amendments, the two elements of 4bis (definition and jurisdic-
tion) were bifurcated into separate Understandings:
Domestic jurisdiction over the crime of aggression
4. It is understood that the amendments that address the definition of the act of aggression
and the crime of aggression do so for the purpose of this Statute only. The amendments
shall, in accordance with article 10 of the Rome Statute, not be interpreted as limiting or
prejudicing in any way existing or developing rules of international law for purposes other
than this Statute.
5. It is understood that the amendments shall not be interpreted as creating the right or ob-
ligation to exercise domestic jurisdiction with respect to an act of aggression committed by
another State.151
These Understandings should discourage,152 but would not preclude,
states from harmonizing their penal codes with any new aggression provisions
and from launching domestic aggression prosecutions. At a minimum,
Understanding 5 would preclude a state from citing the aggression amend-
ments as support for the extension of domestic jurisdiction over crimes of ag-
gression committed by non-nationals.
5. A Prosecutorial Policy
Given that few states now possess the ability to prosecute the crime of aggres-
sion domestically, concurrent jurisdiction between the world’s penal codes and
the ICC Statute will not exist if and when the Court’s ability to prosecute
crime of aggression is activated. And, the definitions of most domestic and
international crimes will not cover the same conduct penalized by the prohib-
ition against aggression. Without amendments to domestic law, the Court
could find itself in a position of preempting the prosecutorial efforts of domes-
tic courts ç notwithstanding credible atrocity crime charges ç on the sole
ground that potential aggression charges are lacking for whatever reason.153
To avoid this assertion of ICC jurisdiction, states parties and other concerned
150 Non-paper by the President of the Assembly, Draft Resolution: The crime of aggression, 10 June
2010.
151 Res. 6, Annex III.
152 See C. Kre and L. von Holtzendorff, ‘The Kampala Compromise on the Crime of Aggression’, 8
JICJ (2010) 1179, at 1216 (noting that the fifth Understanding apparently discourages states
from codifying the crime of aggression, except perhaps pursuant to the active personality
principle).
153 To be sure, none of the cases to arise out of the current situations before the ICC implicates the
crime of aggression, although situations no longer under consideration (such as Iraq) may
have. The crime could also be relevant to future cases from Central Africa as well as other
situations still in the wings (such as Georgia, Palestine, and Korea). See ICC, OTP,
Communications, Referrals and Preliminary Examinations, available online at http://www.icc-
cpi.int/Menus/ICC/StructureþofþtheþCourt/OfficeþofþtheþProsecutor/CommþandþRef/
(visited 7 November 2011).
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states may be tempted to amend their penal codes to include the crime of ag-
gression, notwithstanding Understandings 4 and 5. This result would enable
ç and perhaps encourage ç domestic prosecutions for the crime of aggres-
sion with all of their attendant concerns.
It is possible to both promote the principle of positive complementarity154
and encourage states to live up to their treaty- and customary international
law-based obligations to prosecute international crimes,155 while still respect-
ing the ethos behind Understandings 4 and 5. When a wartime crime base
is the subject of a credible domestic investigation and prosecution ç for one
of the atrocity crimes or their domestic analogues ç the ICC should generally
stay its hand even if aggression charges are not forthcoming or available.156
This will prioritize the exercise of domestic jurisdiction in keeping with posi-
tive complementarity and preserve Court resources for situations in which no
state is credibly asserting its penal jurisdiction over a situation.
This approach is amenable to an exception that can be accommodated
within the existing treaty text and the aggression amendments. This exception
concerns situations in which an act of aggression is the primary violation of
international criminal law arising out of a particular situation. This would
be the case, for example, following so-called ‘clean’ wars ç armed conflicts
fought largely in compliance with humanitarian law.157 In these cases, it
would be appropriate for the ICC Prosecutor to consider asserting ICC jurisdic-
tion in order to enforce the prohibition of aggression. Going forward with this
narrow set of cases would ensure that the crux of the potential defendant’s
criminal conduct is subject to prosecution. It would also enable the ICC to
154 See ICC, OTP, Report on Prosecutorial Strategy, 5 September 2006, available online at http://
www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/OTPProsecutorialStrategy_2006-2009.pdf (visited 7 November 2011),
(noting that the OTP encourages genuine national proceedings where possible).
155 Rastan, supra note 118, at 105 (noting treaty and/or customary obligations to prosecute inter-
national crimes).
156 This approach finds affinity with Heller’s sentence-based theory of complementarity, which
focuses not on the particular charges brought, but the sentence awarded. See Heller, supra
note 130, at 2 (arguing that ‘any national prosecution of an ordinary crime satisfies the prin-
ciple of complementarity as long as it results in a sentence equal to, or longer than, the sen-
tence the perpetrator would receive from the ICC’.).
157 The 26 March 2010 torpedo attack on the South KoreanWarship Cheonan provides a useful ex-
ample. See N. Loader, ‘Investigation concludes North Korean missile sunk the Cheonan killing
46’, Asian Correspondent, 21 May 2010, available online at http://us.asiancorrespondent.com/
video/investigation-concludes-north-korea.htm (visited 7 November 2011). The attack appears
to be a classic case of bilateral aggression, with a clear victim state and a clear aggressor
state. The victims were 46 crewmembers; no civilians were injured. Assuming the attack ex-
ceeds the necessary threshold with respect to ‘character, gravity, and scale’ of Art. 8bis(1),
which it may not on its own unless the long history of tensions between the two nations are
taken into account, aggression would be the only chargeable crime. The attack could not be
charged as a war crime (for lack of an armed conflict or victim with protected person status)
or crime against humanity (for lack of an attack against a civilian population). Nonetheless,
this situation is already under consideration by the ICC’s Prosecutor. See ICC Prosecutor:
alleged war crimes in the territory of the Republic of Korea under preliminary examination,
6 December 2010, available online at http://www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ICC/Structureþofþtheþ
Court/OfficeþofþtheþProsecutor/CommþandþRef/Korea/ (visited 7 November 2011).
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develop the anti-aggression norm with a consensus definition of the crime and
subject to a carefully negotiated jurisdictional regime.
Although not mandated by the ICC’s complementarity regime, a general de-
ferral to the exercise of domestic jurisdiction when all-but-aggression charges
are being pursued can be effectively accomplished through a policy of prosecu-
torial discretion.158 As he has done in the past,159 the Prosecutor should an-
nounce such a policy well in advance of 2017 in order to reassure states
parties and other concerned states that the Court will not readily assert juris-
diction concurrent to domestic courts just because the prosecuting state lacks
the ability to prosecute the crime of aggression per se. In this way, the
Prosecutor can contribute to the implementation of Understandings 4 and 5
within the framework of the principle of complementarity. That said, the ASP
should also consider promulgating a more express Understanding to solidify
this approach and the appropriate division of labour between the ICC and do-
mestic courts in the aggression context.
6. Conclusion
Notwithstanding the current dearth of domestic precedent involving the crime
of aggression, as a consequence of ratifying or adopting the amendments to
the ICC Statute, the world’s legislatures may be tempted to amend their domes-
tic penal codes to include the crime of aggression alongside the other ICC
crimes. This might, in turn, enable or even encourage domestic prosecutions
for aggression under either the traditional bases of jurisdiction or even pursu-
ant to more extraordinary grounds ç a state of affairs fraught with legal and
political problems.
If the approach advocated herein is implemented, the Court will exercise a
de facto exclusivity over the crime of aggression without undermining domes-
tic prosecutions of the atrocity crimes. Concentrating prosecutions of the
crime of aggression before the ICC has the benefit of guaranteeing to defend-
ants that they will be prosecuted under a consensus international definition
subject to the judicial controls and mechanisms of political oversight endorsed
by the ASP. Such prosecutions before an international body will also be less
likely to jeopardize international relations by having the courts of one state sit
in judgment over the acts of a co-equal sovereign.
158 Art. 53 ICCSt. envisions prosecutorial discretion in the interests of justice.
159 The OTP has circulated a number of draft and policy papers setting forth its approach to its
mandate. See OTP, Office of the Prosecutor, Policies and Strategies, available online at http://
www2.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ICC/StructureþofþtheþCourt/OfficeþofþtheþProsecutor/
PoliciesþandþStrategies/ (visited 7 November 2011). The Prosecutor also regularly addresses
the ASP and other multilateral institutions, such as the Security Council. But see A. Marston
Danner, ‘Enhancing the Legitimacy and Accountability of Prosecutorial Discretion at the
International Criminal Court’, 97 AJIL (2003) 510, at 541 (arguing that the ICC Prosecutor
should issue prosecutorial guidelines to enhance transparency, legitimacy, and
accountability).
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In 2012, the Court will undergo an unprecedented turnover of its core pro-
fessional staff, including the appointment of a new Chief Prosecutor160 along-
side six new judges and a new President of the ASP.161 As such, it will fall to
the new Prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda, to develop her Office’s policy toward the
crime of aggression. Since the ASP may activate the crime of aggression on
the new Prosecutor’s watch, disseminating a policy on the crime of aggression
should be one of the first priorities of the new Prosecutor. This will signal to
members of the ASP that they need not domesticate the crime of aggression
in order to enjoy the privilege of complementarity.
160 The Prosecutor is elected by the ASP for a nine-year term (Art. 42(4) ICCSt.).
161 See B. Van Schaack, ‘Major Staff Turnover Anticipated at ICC’, blogspot at IntLawGrrls, 16
March 2011, available online at http://intlawgrrls.blogspot.com/2011/03/major-staff-turnover-
anticipated-at-icc.html (visited 7 November 2011).
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